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Core Identification and Attack Strategies
Against Regenerative Complex Networks
W. Guo and X. Lu
Modeling enemy networks in a way that reveals their key entities
and links is important when disrupting complex networks with high
redundancy. In this paper, we examine how best to attack such networks
under a limited ground intelligence constraint. The key modeling
contribution is to include both the heterogeneity of the node functions
and the dynamics of recuperation after destruction. Through identifying
the core nodes, the results show that ground intelligence should focus on
locating and attacking high degree nodes, yielding a 41% reduction in
conflict length over random opportunistic targeting and a 23% reduction
over specialist targeting. Even when difficult to replace specialists are
considered, targeting high degree nodes that can recuperate quickly,
remains the most effective method of attack. The impact is to allow
military forces to more effectively target enemy nodes that will cause
functional paralysis and create further collapses.
Introduction
Conflict Against Complex Organisations
The war on terror has dominated western military engagement in the
last 15 years. In total, the war on terror is set to exceed the relative
cost of the Second World War. Prolonged military engagement against
complex transnational organisations is challenging. The location of key
entities are often hidden and require ground intelligence to slowly reveal
and target over a short time window. Despite the lack of precise spatial-
temporal information of the entities, complex network models can still
be constructed based on knowledge of the entities and their connections
[1]. Unlike traditional organisations that have a spanning tree structure,
complex networks typically have high levels of redundancy at both
the functional and topological level [2]. Even the removal of one key
entity will often see its functionality restored by other existing or new
entities (recuperation). The inability to simultaneously target most of
the key entities, coupled with the network’s resilience against removal
attacks, has greatly contributed to long costly wars. Unlike resilient
telecommunication networks (i.e., the Internet [3]), terrorist network
nodes have varying functions and can recuperate at different rates.
Inspired by a similar complexity in ecology networks [4, 5], this paper
will examine how to target such networks.
Methods of Disruption and Contribution
Methods aimed at disrupting the operation of networks need to be
tailored towards the nature of the network. For example, conventional
surgical strikes, which are aimed at disrupting hierarchical organisations;
can be ineffective against networks with a high level of redundancy.
Over the past decade, a number of research outputs have focused on
using complex network theory to model terrorist organisations, including:
microscopic terrorist cells (i.e., the 9/11 network [1]), as well as
macroscopic terror networks [6]. However, existing models have been
simplistic in that they are mainly focused on static statistical metrics
such as the overall network’s connectivity (link density) or each node’s
betweenness (path importance) [7]. What has been lacking in the research
is a focus on the dynamics and heterogeneity of terrorist networks,
such that new nodes and links are able to form for the purpose of
compensating the loss of existing ones. This ability to heal (recuperate)
can cause traditional surgical strikes to be even less effective against
enemy networks with built in redundancies. This paper will model
more realistic enemy networks by adding heterogeneous functions and
rates of recuperation. These dynamic features complement the static and
statistical measures used in complex network theory to form a more
heterogeneous and dynamic model.
Methodology
Dynamic Heterogeneous Network Model
In this short paper, we examine a relatively small terror network
based on the 9/11 attack and include all known support nodes [1]. The
9/11 network is chosen because it is well understood and has the same
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Fig. 1 9/11 Terrorist Network and Known Associates with Key Nodes Labelled.
complexity features as larger terrorism networks such as the Al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, and ISIS. The 9/11 network comprises of N = 36 nodes
and L= 190 links, which has high levels of topological redundancy
when compared to a spanning tree structure (minimum of L=N −
1 = 35 links). Each node is assigned a functional skill value sn to
represent its contribution to the overall network. To give a more general
understanding of how different complex networks behave under removal
attacks, we also create a number of parallel networks that have the same
N and L parameters [2]: (a) a rewired network to maximize topological
redundancy; (b) a small-world network to create uniform number of hops
to connect two nodes; (c) randomized ecology food web found in nature;
and (d) the Erdos-Renyi (ER) network model to benchmark results.
In terms of network heterogeneity, nodes can be generally classified
as specialists and generalists [7]. The distinction is important in terms
of how replaceable these nodes are if removed. We define a generalist as
having no special skill sets and can be replaced quickly sn = 1. We define
specialists have special skill sets and we classify them into three levels
(sn = [2, 3, 4]). For this initial study, we define the rate of recuperation rn
as linearly ∝ sn and the percentage of links recuperated as p. It has been
argued that complex enemy organisations have leadership nodes that can
be easily replaced due to the bottom-up dynamics of such organisations
[8]. Conversely, removing nodes with rare technical skill sets that require
years to train can be more effective [9]. Fig. 1 shows the 9/11 network
with key nodes labelled with their function and the assigned value sn.
Notice how the nodes with the highest skill value sn do not necessarily
have a high degree (d, number of links).
Disruption Strategies
We assume that we cannot removal all the nodes simultaneously due
to limited ground intelligence on the nodes’ location. We assume we can
only get intelligence in one of two manners: 1) random opportunistic
intelligence, or 2) targeted intelligence (i.e., identify a node of interest
and obtain the location for removal). Hence, the removal process is used
in this paper is sequential removal of nodes. We measure the robustness
of the network and the success of the disruption strategy as: how many
removals (X) are required until no links remain between nodes [10]. We
consider 3 attack strategies with 500 Monte-Carlo iterations per result:
• Random Opportunity: remove nodes in accordance to emerging ground
intelligence or opportunities;
• Highest Degree: remove nodes in accordance to nodes that have
the highest degree, implying the node is either a commander or an
important communication or logistic hub;
• Highest Specialist: remove nodes in accordance to nodes that have the
lowest recuperation rate, disrupting both the function of the network
and the rate of overall functional and topological recovery;
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Fig. 2 Degree and Core Profiling for the 9/11 Terror Network. Specialists are
labelled with their corresponding functions and the skill value sn.
Table 1: Static Network: Mean No. of Removals before Collapse.
No Recuperation
Network Type Random Degree Specialist
9/11 27.5 16 21
Rewired 27.5 18.3 23
Small-World 32.0 25.7 27
Food-Web 27.9 18.5 23
Erdos-Renyi (ER) 31.7 25.6 27
Results
Core Identification
The degree (d) of a node in a complex network is defined as the
number of links it has with other nodes. The core and periphery are
terms associated with nodes which are deemed to have a high and low
degree respectively. The core can be found through a recent core-profiling
method [11] (as shown in Fig. 2), where it the number of connections
each node has with a node that has a higher degree. By ranking the plot
in Fig. 2 in descending degree value, the first C nodes before the core
profiling value reaches a local maximum is defined as the core (i.e., the
first 6-7 names) [11]. Referring to the body of evidence found in the
official 9/11 report [12], we can see that this core corresponds to the ring
leaders and crucial members of the terrorist group, most of them directly
in what became known as the Hamburg Cell. Mohamed Atta (highest
degree d= 14) is the operational ring leader of the 9/11 operation and
received most of the funding and instructions from senior figures Al-
Qaeda (including bin Laden).Yet, the key specialist skills reside mostly
outside the core nodes. For example, the chief financier M. Ahmed Al-
Hisawi and the financial support shell company owned by Darkazanli
both have a relatively low degree (d= 3).
Robustness to Disruption
In Table 1, we can see two cases: (i) a static heterogeneous network
with no recuperation, and (ii) a dynamic heterogeneous network with
recuperation that is dependent on the skill of the node rn ∝ sn. We first
observe that the robustness (number of removals required for collapse) of
the 9/11 network is 12-15% lower than the equivalent complex network
models (i.e., rewired, small-world, food-web, and ER). In particular, it is
high susceptible to high degree removal strategy, whereby its robustness
is 36% lower than the equivalent ER model. We also note that when there
Table 2: Dynamic Network: Mean No. of Removals before Collapse.
With Recuperation Rate r and Link Restored p
Dynamic Network Type Degree Specialist
9/11 (r= 15s, p= 0.4) 24 26
9/11 (r= 15s, p= 0.4) 25 27
9/11 (r= 15s, p= 0.6) 26 30
9/11 (r= 15s, p= 0.7) 27 33
9/11 (r= 15s, p= 0.8) 28 69
is no opportunity for the enemy network to recuperate, due to reasons
such as rapid attacks or denial of resources, the high degree removal
strategy is superior to removing highly skilled specialists. Compared to
random opportunity removal, high degree removal is up to 38% more
effective.
When recuperation is considered (Table 2), we observe two key
results. First of all, we note that the number of removals required to
achieve collapse is at least 25% higher. The second observation is that we
notice degree targeting is largely insensitive to the increased recuperation
effects. As the link recuperation ratio p increases by 100%, the number
of removals required only increases by 16%, whereas the specialist
targeting removal number increases by 165%. Despite recent suggestions
that specialist removal can be more effective [9], we have shown that
targeting high degree nodes remains the most effective method of attack
and is largely insensitive to varying recuperation rates that depends on
the specialists’ skill level.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered how best to attack a complex
network through surgical node removal, under an operational constraint
of one removal per attack. The results suggest that targeting high
degree nodes is still the most effective method for both the static and
dynamic network models, even when difficult to replace specialists are
considered. The algorithms developed in this paper can be used to
identify key military targets and estimate the length of military conflicts.
The algorithm itself can be integrated into existing battle and war
simulation platforms.
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